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ABSTRACT
Fuzzing has played an important role in improving software
development and testing over the course of several decades.
Recent research in fuzzing has focused on applications of
machine learning (ML), offering useful tools to overcome
challenges in the fuzzing process. This review surveys the
current research in applying ML to fuzzing. Specifically, this
review discusses successful applications of ML to fuzzing,
briefly explores challenges encountered, and motivates fu-
ture research to address fuzzing bottlenecks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Fuzzing is a technique in which a large number of gener-
ated inputs, both valid and invalid, are fed into a program to
search for flaws and vulnerabilities. Fuzzers, or automated
tools to perform fuzzing, have played an important role in
quality assurance, system administration, and vulnerabil-
ity assessment over the last three decades [15, 16, 34, 48].
Modern fuzzers now incorporate techniques from other dis-
ciplines; in this survey, we explore how some modern fuzzers
incorporate different types of machine learning (ML). We
specifically focus on fuzzers used for vulnerability assess-
ment due to their widespread use.
Machine learning is a method for training computer mod-
els to perform some operation without being explicitly pro-
grammed. ML techniques are applied across a wide range
of problems, from image processing to sequence modeling
[21, 26, 47]. In this survey, we focus on three main types
of ML, each of which is suited for a different type of task.
Supervised learning is used to train a model to identify the
class label of a given data point, such as whether an image
contains a specific object. This type of ML requires data sets
where each data point is given an explicit label. Unsuper-
vised learning is used to train a model to find patterns or
similarities between data points rather than for classification.
This type of ML is used when the data does not have explicit
labels. Reinforcement learning is used to train a model, often
referred to as an agent, to take an optimal set of actions in
an environment. This type of ML rewards the agent for each
action it takes in the environment. Similar to supervised
learning, the rewards act as a label for the agent and pro-
vide an indication of the optimal actions to take. Thus, the
agent can be trained to take a set of actions which lead to the
highest reward. Each of these three types can also take on a
particular form of ML called Deep learning. Deep learning
refers to a type of hierarchical learning that can be used to
more effectively learn the underlying features and structure
of a set of data points [21].
In this survey, we explore how ML has been applied to
address core research questions in fuzzers used for vulnera-
bility assessment. This survey is representative rather than
exhaustive; we do not attempt to discuss all applications of
ML in fuzzers. In Section 2, we give a brief overview of the
fuzzing process. In Section 3, we explore previous and on-
going research applying ML techniques to fuzzing. We also
discuss difficulties associated with applying ML to fuzzing.
We conclude with a summary of how ML has been applied
to fuzzing and how ML might be applied to fuzzing in the
future.
2 OVERVIEW OF FUZZING
In “A Review of Fuzzing Tools and Methods” [17], Fell ex-
plores the use of fuzzers for vulnerability assessment. We
recommend Fell’s treatment of fuzzing for the interested
reader as he describes the process in depth. Here, we provide
only a brief overview of fuzzing to frame our discussion of
where and howmachine learning (ML) techniques have been
applied, which will be covered in Section 3.
Again, fuzzing is a technique in which a large number
of generated inputs, both valid and invalid, are fed into a
program to search for flaws and vulnerabilities. Fuzzers auto-
mate much of this process, taking in initial program knowl-
edge and sending out any interesting program states discov-
ered [36]. Often, a human user both provides initial program
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knowledge and analyzes these output program states. Tradi-
tionally, “interesting program states” were program crashes
that identified flaws and vulnerabilities in the progam, but
more complex program monitoring techniques now allow
for identification of other types of interesting states.
The goal of a fuzzer is to create inputs that cause the pro-
gram to execute program paths, discovering those that lead
to interesting program states. Thus, fuzzers are frequently
measured by the diversity of program paths explored, termed
coverage.
In this section, we introduce types of fuzzers and break
down the fuzzing process into stages. We walk through each
stage, showing how the different types of fuzzers approach
some stages differently. We introduce the types of tasks that
exist in each stage, framing the most compelling challenges
that are currently not fully solved at each stage. Finally, we
touch on ways to compare fuzzers.
Types of Fuzzers
A fuzzer that generates completely random input and feeds it
to a program is a naïve fuzzer. While naïve fuzzers are fairly
easy to implement, they are unlikely to reach interesting
program states in a timely manner. Three primary types of
modern fuzzers improve on naïve fuzzers: mutation-based,
generation-based, and evolutionary.
Mutation-based fuzzers blindly mutate or manipulate
provided input to feed to the program. Generally mutation-
based fuzzers are not aware of the expected input format
or specifications, and they cannot select mutations wisely.
Peach is a fuzzer that can perform mutation-based as well as
generation-based fuzzing [49].
Generation-based fuzzers take information about the
expected input format or protocol through specifications.
Generation-based fuzzers generate or craft inputs based on
these specifications. Generation-based fuzzers include Peach
and Sulley, a Python fuzzing framework that can generate
inputs for file transfer protocols, network protocols, and file
formats [1].
Evolutionary fuzzers, the newest type of fuzzers, build
on mutation-based fuzzers by selecting some inputs over
others for mutation. Specifically, evolutionary fuzzers aim
to evaluate what each input causes the program to do and
change how they proceed based on that evaluation. Practi-
cally, current state-of-the-art evolutionary fuzzers rank in-
puts using a fitness function (often coverage) and select the
best-ranked inputs to mutate. Example evolutionary fuzzers
include honggfuzz [22], AFL [58], and libFuzzer [31].
For the interested reader, Vimpari’s 2015 thesis evaluates
the utility of a subset of free fuzzers [51]. However, we move
on to explore the fuzzing process.
Fuzzing Process
Figure 1 breaks a general fuzzing process into stages. Each
fuzzer takes in program knowledge, uses that knowledge to
generate inputs, select inputs to feed to the program being
fuzzed, monitor program actions in response to each input,
and identify and export any interesting program states for the
user to analyze. The fuzzer automatically repeats the inner
stages, and it can use results from monitoring the program
to evaluate input and inform the next input generation stage.
While this process describes fuzzing in general, the different
types of fuzzing exhibit nuances in generating input and eval-
uating inputs based on results from monitoring the program.
We will next discuss these stages and their nuances.
Pre-Fuzzing: ProgramKnowledge. Prior to beginning the fuzzing
process, a user incorporates program knowledge into the
fuzzer. At a minimum, a fuzzer needs program knowledge
about how to instrument or observe a program, including
what constitutes an interesting program state, and about
which input interfaces to explore. For naïve fuzzers, this
knowledge is sufficient to generate randomized input and
send it to the indicated interfaces. For non-naïve fuzzers,
however, additional program knowledge is needed to effec-
tively generate inputs.
Mutation-based fuzzers often require additional pro-
gram knowledge in the form of an input corpus, or a set of
program inputs to feed to the indicated interfaces, in order to
effectively generate inputs. Such program inputs tend to be
examples of expected inputs, e.g., TLS handshake buffers for
OpenSSL [4] or memory dumps for Volatility [9]. Valid initial
inputs guide the fuzzer to explore deep program states, i.e.,
states that are found after many branches in the program, by
allowing the program to iterate on valid input, as opposed to
random initial inputs that may not pass initial program input
checks. Initial input corpora are generally created manually,
but large sets of inputs do pre-exist for some applications
(e.g., all PDFs on the internet for Adobe Reader).
Generation-based fuzzers take in additional program
knowledge in the form of input specifications, such as ex-
pected file formats or protocol descriptions. Generation-
based fuzzers typically achieve better code coverage and
deeper program state exploration thanmutation-based fuzzers
[17]. These fuzzers are more difficult to set up because they
require developing accurate program input specifications,
which is often significantly more time-intensive than gener-
ating an input corpus. Generation-based fuzzers are limited
to exploring the input space specified by these specifications.
Evolutionary fuzzers, like mutation-based fuzzers, take
in additional program knowledge through an input corpus.
Typically, program knowledge is provided by the human
user and is developed manually. In contrast, fuzzers auto-
matically iterate over the next three stages of the fuzzing
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Figure 1: Fuzzing Process
process. A fuzzer will generate new inputs, down-select and
order inputs to send to the program, monitor the program
for interesting program states, and repeat, generally until
the user terminates the fuzzer. We explore these stages next.
Stage 1: Generate Inputs. In the first stage of the fuzzing pro-
cess, the fuzzer uses program knowledge to generate inputs
to feed to the program through the identified interfaces. The
goal of this stage is to create inputs that will explore new
and interesting program states. Not all of the new inputs will
be sent to the program; the next stage of the fuzzing process
down-selects to the most relevant of the inputs generated
here. However, the fuzzer aims here to generate the most
relevant inputs.
Mutation-based fuzzers generate new inputs by manip-
ulating previous “interesting” inputs. In the first iteration of
this stage, a fuzzer manipulates input provided in its input
corpus. Later, the fuzzer may adjust its collection of inter-
esting inputs based on results from monitoring the program
and evaluating input performance.
Mutation-based fuzzers mutate an interesting input by
altering some portion of the input. Two decisions are nec-
essary for such mutation: 1) where to mutate (including the
length of the mutation), and 2) what new value to use for the
mutation [40]. Fuzzers use many techniques to make these
decisions. Common techniques include randomization (from
bits to entire sections), specific bit flips, integer increments,
and integer bound analysis and substitution.
Generation-based fuzzers generate inputs by creating
a new input according to the input specification. Given a
specification, a finite number of inputs corresponding to
that specification exist [48]. Because the input search space
is finite, generation-based fuzzers can explore all possible
specified inputs, which allows generation-based fuzzers to
accurately measure how much of the input space they have
explored.
Evolutionary fuzzers, again likemutation-based fuzzers,
generate new inputs by manipulating previous interesting
inputs. Generally, evolutionary fuzzers either mutate one
input or select two or more inputs and perform crossover,
combining components of the selected inputs to make a
new input; however, other randomization techniques may be
used as well. These fuzzers select inputs for randomization
by evaluating input performance in previous stages.
Theoretically, mutation-based and evolutionary fuzzers
could generate an infinite number of inputs. The infinite
input search space makes it difficult to estimate how much
of the input space has been explored. Additionally, as input
lengths grow, mutation and crossover techniques require
more manipulations to generate each new input and thus
become more computationally challenging [18]. This can
slow the fuzzing process considerably and severely limit the
coverage obtained by the fuzzer in a set amount of time.
Symbolic Execution is a static analysis technique that
can help to generate new inputs that increase fuzzer coverage.
Although symbolic execution is not a type of fuzzer, tools
such as Driller [46] and SAGE [19] have combined fuzzing
and symbolic execution to improve input generation. We
discuss symbolic execution separately here because it can
generate new inputs for mutation-based and evolutionary
fuzzers. These new inputs can be added to the input corpus
or otherwise force-fed to the program. We briefly describe
how symbolic execution can help to generate new inputs to
increase coverage.
Symbolic execution analyzes a program to find constraints,
or limitations, on data values inside the program without
making assumptions about input values fed to the program.1
Symbolic execution works by abstracting input data into
symbolic values, or data that might take on many concrete
values, and stepping through the program using these sym-
bolic values. When the program branches on a symbolic
value, e.g., if (x < 10), either side of the branch might be
taken. In such cases, the symbolic execution engine makes
1Actually, constraints can be added to input values as well, but we ignore
that here for simplicity.
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two symbolic program states, each including a constraint
met by the taken side of the branch, and continues symbol-
ically executing both of those states. In our example, the
branch-taken state would include the constraint x < 10 and
the branch-not-taken state would include the constraint x
>= 10; other than that, the two symbolic states would be
identical.
A symbolic state includes constraints representing the se-
ries of branch decisions necessary to reach that state, i.e., a
path. A user can ask questions about the path used to reach
that state. For example, what is a value of x that would reach
this point? To answer such a question, the symbolic state is
modeled as a set of constraints that encode, for each input
variable, the range of valid values along the path. A con-
straint solver then solves these constraints, either returning
a valid concrete assignment to the input variables or prov-
ing that no such assignment exists (i.e., the constraints are
unsatisfiable) [39]. This assignment represents an input that
would cause the program to reach the desired program state
by making the same branch decisions as those in the original
path.
Fuzzers can use symbolic execution to create new inputs
that explore new or interesting paths by asking the solver
for solutions to newly discovered symbolic states. Unfortu-
nately, symbolic execution is computationally costly, and the
large number of possible program paths makes it infeasible
to symbolically execute an entire program.2 This high cost
means that symbolic execution must be used cleverly; it is
typically useful for finding paths that are difficult to find
through random exploration. To mitigate this cost, fuzzers
pair symbolic execution with their standard input generation
techniques [19]. The symbolic execution engine can limit
paths by “following” an interesting input, e.g., only allowing
new symbolic states to diverge from the input for a limited
number of branches. However, the computational costs and
path explosion remain significant hurdles. A large number
of research efforts are attempting to address these research
challenges in symbolic execution [25, 35, 46].
Unfortunately, fuzzers still suffer from low coverage, even
when pairing their specialized input generation techniques
with symbolic execution. Effective input generation remains
a research challenge, and other clever applications of new
techniques may help to intelligently generate inputs that
increase coverage. However, even these input generation
techniques create many more inputs than fuzzers have com-
putational time to execute. In the next stage, inputs are fil-
tered to a smaller set to be fed into the program.
Stage 2: Select Inputs. In the second stage of the fuzzing
process, the fuzzer selects and orders the inputs to send to the
2Paths or symbolic states are exponential in the number of branches, and
each iteration of a loop results in another branch.
program. Recall, a fuzzer’s goal is to exercise new program
paths quickly. As Böhme et al. assert, however, most inputs
exercise the same few program paths [5, 6]. To combat this,
a fuzzer must use its input corpus effectively and minimize
the computation spent to discover new program paths.
Input test scheduling, or seed selection, can help combat
this tendency of inputs to explore limited program paths.
Input test scheduling ranks and selects inputs and input or-
der, anticipating which new inputs are most likely to lead to
new and disjoint interesting program states. For vulnerabil-
ity assessment, test scheduling generally chooses inputs to
maximize the number of bugs found [53]. Input test sched-
uling is critical to effectively explore large or infinite input
search spaces, but finding the right scheduling strategy for a
particular program and fuzzer remains a research challenge.
Luckily, tools such as FuzzSim quickly compare input selec-
tion strategies using input performance information across
many iterations of the process [53].
As mentioned previously, as the fuzzer continuous to iter-
ate through the process, mutation-based and evolutionary
fuzzers may collect many extremely large inputs. This artifi-
cially slows down the fuzzing process. To combat this, the
fuzzer or user needs to perform either corpus minimization,
reducing the number of inputs, or input minimization, reduc-
ing the size of each input. For example, corpus distillation,
introduced by Ormandy in “Making Software Dumberer”
[37], does this by reducing a set of inputs to the minimal
set of inputs that maintain the same coverage. SEC Consult,
an Austrian vulnerability lab with a fuzzing capability, ig-
nores specific portions of the input search space identified
through manual analysis as not interesting in order to limit
the number of manipulations performed on each input [18].
Whether intelligently scheduling inputs, reducing the
number of active inputs, or keeping inputs small, these tech-
niques attempt to reduce the time needed for a fuzzer to find
new interesting program states. However, effectively using
the fuzzer’s limited computational time remains a research
challenge. In the next stage, the fuzzer sends the selected in-
puts, monitors the program’s resulting actions, and identifies
interesting program states.
Stage 3: Monitor Program. In the third stage of the fuzzing
process, the fuzzer feeds the program chosen inputs and
monitors the program to identify interesting program states.
“Interesting program states” exhibit a specific program behav-
ior in that state. Inmost cases, a crash represents the behavior
of interest (i.e., the program fails unexpectedly). However,
any behavior that is observable through program instrumen-
tation might be used to identify interesting program states.
For example, Valgrind can detect (observe) memory corrup-
tion even if the corruption does not cause a crash [50]. As
another example, Heelan uses fuzzing to identify potential
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program memory allocators [23]. For vulnerability assess-
ment, interesting behaviors are observable behaviors that
relate to possible flaws or vulnerabilities.
As mentioned, a fuzzer requires program knowledge about
how to instrument the program and what constitutes an in-
teresting program state. A human user often provides this
information, but the definition of what an interesting pro-
gram state should be remains a research challenge. In the
vulnerability assessment case that is, what observable behav-
iors are most relevant to identifying flaws or vulnerabilities?
Once the fuzzer has identified an interesting program
state, it needs to provide descriptions of that state back to
the user for analysis. Program state descriptions differ wildly
by fuzzer. For example, on a crash, one fuzzer might simply
provide the input causing the crash, while another fuzzer
might provide a full core dump, a capture of programmemory
at the point of the failure. After evaluation (the next stage),
this information might guide further fuzzing iterations.
Stage 4: Evaluate Inputs. In the fourth stage of the fuzzing
process, the fuzzer evaluates how well inputs performed.
Many fuzzers use code coverage to measure the utility of an
input: if the input causes execution of a new part of code
(generally, a new basic block), that input has increased cov-
erage and is rated highly. The libFuzzer tool uses a similar
metric, data coverage, which also rates an input highly if new
data values occur at a previously explored comparison in the
code. Some fuzzers use bug discovery as a metric; inputs that
cause a crash are rated highly.
Evolutionary fuzzers require feedback about how well
inputs performed [17]; that is, they must be able to evaluate
inputs and rank them. These fuzzers use input rank both in
generating new inputs and in selecting and sending inputs.
Mutation-based and generation-based fuzzers do not
generally require input performance feedback, but the same
metrics can help to evaluate a fuzzer’s performance overall.
Practically, coverage metrics are heuristics and do not
provide a complete assessment of input performance. Thus,
effective and comparable metrics remain a research chal-
lenge.
Post-Fuzzing: Interesting Program States. Following the fuzzing
process, the user analyzes interesting program states output
by the fuzzer. This process is often highly manual and bene-
fits from research in related areas in software engineering.
For each output state, the user analyzes the state to deter-
mine the root cause of the interesting behavior in that state.
Often the user manually observes as the program executes
the associated input and hopes to identify the root cause.
The user then decides whether the root cause represents a
new flaw or vulnerability.
Often fuzzers output an overwhelming number of interest-
ing program states. The user must perform triage to decide
which interesting program states merit further investigation.
Unfortunately, output program states often share the same
root cause. Even worse, states that share the same root cause
can appear drastically different. For example, a memory cor-
ruption vulnerability can result in crashes in many different
parts of the program, with wildly different memory images,
because the effect of the vulnerability is not observed imme-
diately. Some automated tools attempt to deduplicate fuzzer
outputs [23] or root causes, but these are often imperfect, and
triage and root cause analysis remain research challenges.
Comparing Fuzzers
Unfortunately, despite all the research into making fuzzers
more effective and efficient, it is hard to determine whether
one fuzzer is “better” than another. Measuring the utility of
a fuzzer is difficult for many reasons, from inability to ex-
plore the entire input search space which biases performance
measures; to lack of ground truth, which makes validation
a difficult and manual process; to randomness exploited in
the fuzzing process, which introduces the need for statistical
testing. For example, in vulnerability analysis, fuzzers are
often judged by number of unique vulnerabilities; however,
when a new fuzzer finds new vulnerabilities in a set of real-
world programs, this simply shows that the fuzzer’s core
algorithm is better suited to that set of programs than other
algorithms [41]. Results do not necessarily generalize well.
To help judge fuzzer utility, Klees recently proposed a
framework for fuzzer comparison [24]. Klees calls for con-
trolling comparisons by specifying: a baseline fuzzer, a bench-
mark suite of target programs, a performance metric, con-
figuration parameters comparable to the baseline, and suffi-
cient number of trials for statistical testing [24]. Small data
sets with known flaws can be used to compare and vali-
date fuzzers in this way. Unfortunately, however, these com-
parisons are computationally expensive, and, as mentioned,
results do not necessarily generalize. Practically, until thor-
ough benchmarks for this framework have been developed,
users will have to rely on their intuition to guide decisions
about which fuzzer to use for a particular program, how
to configure or adapt that fuzzer, and whether that fuzzer
performs well enough. Effective fuzzer comparison remains
a significant research challenge.
3 APPLICATIONS OF MACHINE LEARNING TO
FUZZING
In this section, we explore research applying machine learn-
ing (ML) to the fuzzing process. ML has been used to gener-
ate new inputs in the fuzzing process and, to a lesser extent,
to improve post-fuzzing. Unsupervised learning has seen
the most successful applications to input generation, with
fuzzing tools such as AFL [28] integrating genetic algorithms
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into the input generation process. There are also recent ap-
plications of both supervised and reinforcement learning to
input generation. Additionally, all three types of ML have
been applied to symbolic execution [8, 10, 33, 42, 52, 54],
primarily to reduce constraint equation solve times. Both
supervised and unsupervised learning have been applied to
post-fuzzing processes primarily for crash triage and root
cause categorization [11, 27, 32]. Interestingly, we know of
no research in three areas: input minimization, corpus min-
imization, and seed selection. These pieces of the fuzzing
process tend not to be large bottlenecks, which may account
for the lack of research.
We begin by discussing ML research for input generation.
We then discuss applications of ML to post-fuzzing tasks.
Finally, we conclude by discussing fuzzing tasks that have
not seen ML applications. For each of these areas, we show
how each type of ML offers uniquemethods for improvement
as well as the difficulties of applying each type.
Input Generation
The most successful applications of ML to fuzzing occur in
the input generation stage. In this section we will discuss
how the various types of ML have been applied to input
generation. We will show that unsupervised learning, in the
form of genetic algorithms and deep learning, has had many
successful applications to input generation. We also show
the applications of reinforcement learning and supervised
learning to various types of input generation, although this
research tends to be more exploratory. This section will also
discuss the distinct advantages offered by each ML type to
the input generation problem, as well as the difficulties of
applying each type.
Genetic Algorithms. The most frequently used ML technique
for input generation is the genetic algorithm (GA) [13, 14, 17,
28, 30]. GAs, a type of unsupervised ML inspired by biologi-
cal evolution, provide the core algorithms in evolutionary
fuzzers. GAs take a small base population of inputs, make
small transformations, and keep the transformations that
improve upon the previous input. This iterative nature al-
lows GAs to take an input seed and mutate pieces of it to
explore the code space. GAs have been successful for input
generation due to this ability to build off previous successful
inputs to further explore the code space.
As mentioned in Section 2, evolutionary fuzzers use a fit-
ness function to rank inputs for selection and mutation. The
choice of fitness function can have a tremendous impact on
1) the performance of the fuzzer, 2) the ability of the fuzzer
to identify certain types of bugs, and 3) the tendency to get
stuck in a local minimum. Thus, particular caremust be taken
when choosing a fitness function. While code coverage is
the most common metric used for the fitness function, more
advanced heuristics such as the Dynamic Markov Model
heuristic have also been used [45]. This heuristic allows the
fuzzer to take into account previous mutations which are
used to guide the fuzzer along a path to a suspected vul-
nerable region. In contrast to fitness functions which use
code coverage, the Markov Model heuristic steers the fuzzer
towards regions of the code that exhibit vulnerabilities. In
this way, we see that the fitness function determines the
overall behavior and objectives of the fuzzer. However, dif-
ferent users may desire different fuzzer behaviors. Thus, a
promising area of research may be the development of new
fitness functions which create the desired fuzzer behaviors.
Deep Learning: Unsupervised and Supervised Applications.
Deep learning (DL) has also been applied to input generation,
specifically to improve generation-based andmutation-based
fuzzers. Addressing an often manual and time-intensive task,
Microsoft automatically generated the input grammar for
generation-based fuzzers using Long-Short Term Memory
(LSTM) networks, neural networks often used for sequence
analysis [20]. Separately, Microsoft compared four differ-
ent DL architectures, each attempting to increase mutation-
based fuzzer coverage by identifying promising input bytes
to mutate [3]. This research compared a standard LSTM; a
bidirectional LSTM, which processes input sequences both
forwards and backwards; a sequence-to-sequence model
known as Seq2Seq, which transforms a sequence from one
form to another; and a variant of Seq2Seq that uses an at-
tention mechanism to focus on the most important parts of
an input. While all models increased code coverage in some
situations, LSTMs slightly outperformed the other models
overall. Their method also provides an alternative to GAs
for mutation of inputs for evolutionary fuzzers.
While both of these studies by Microsoft show promise for
DL applications to fuzzing, the ability to transfer DL models
between programs remains a challenge. DL models require
significant computation time for training; they are not in-
tegrated into the fuzzing process as GAs are. Re-training
a model for every new program is likely too costly to be
practical. Further, it is not yet clear whether a DL model
trained on one type of software will transfer well to new
software. Thus, DL will likely benefit fuzzing once models
can be transferred effectively to other programs.
Reinforcement Learning. Several groups have also applied
reinforcement learning (RL) to input generation. Becker et al.
created an RL agent which learned to fuzz the IPv6 protocol
by mutating messages sent to the host [2]. Bottinger et al.
transformed the fuzzing problem into a Markov Decision
Process. They used a deep Q-learning network to learn a
grammar describing inputs for generation-based fuzzers [7].
These two applications of RL to fuzzing provide insight
into effectively defining a reward function for an agent, often
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the most challenging aspect of RL. Often, multiple criteria
must be considered when defining a reward function. For
instance, Becker et al. created a multi-part reward function
based on the following criteria: number of program functions
called from a single input, presence of an error, and potential
corruption or delay of the response message from the pro-
gram [2]. Each part of the reward function played a critical
role in defining the behavior of the RL agent. The presence of
the error acted as the strongest signal to the agent that it had
reached an interesting part of the code space. Additionally,
the program response can be used to guide the agent even
in the absence of the error signal. In this way each part of
the reward function plays a unique role in guiding the agent.
Leaving out any of these criteria can result in an ineffective
agent due to incomplete information. Thus, when defining
a reward function, it is important to consider the different
types of program signals that can be used.
Bottinger et al., on the other hand, experimented with
multiple distinct reward functions, one using code coverage,
another using execution time, and a third combining code
coverage and execution time. Unsurprisingly, the reward
function influenced the fuzzer’s exploration of the input
space; for instance, when Bottinger used execution time as
a reward, the agent learned inputs that caused the program
to terminate quickly. In this way, we see that a user can
influence fuzzer behaviors by crafting a particular reward
function. Overall, reward functions must be defined carefully,
taking into account at least the software program type, type
of bugs being sought, and fuzzing metrics available.
Standard fuzzers do not yet implement RL, and applica-
tions remain theoretical. As in DL, understanding the trans-
ferability of an RL agent remains a research challenge. Cur-
rently, it is not clear if it is necessary to train a new RL agent
for each new program that can be encountered by the fuzzer.
It is likely that training a new RL agent for each new pro-
gram instance would negate any benefits, therefore creating
transferable agents is an important step for future research.
Machine Learning for Symbolic Execution. Here, we briefly
touch on several different ML techniques currently being
explored to improve symbolic execution. As discussed in
Section 2, symbolic execution can help generate effective
new inputs for fuzzers, but computational cost and path
explosion remain significant hurdles. Several research efforts
in ML explore the feasibility of improving constraint solving,
which could support symbolic execution for fuzzer input
generation. Unfortunately, current efforts in using ML do
not rival state-of-the-art approaches using graph algorithms
[25]; they are merely explorations in feasibility.
Several research efforts use supervised learning to solve
constraint equations. Graph Neural Networks were used to
identify features indicating whether constraint equations
had valid solutions or not [8]. In another study, Wu used a
combination of logistic regression and Monte Carlo methods
to identify initial values that increased the probability of find-
ing a valid solution to a constraint equation. TheMonte Carlo
methods were used to identify initial promising values, while
logistic regression was used to indicate the validity of the
solution to the constraint equation using these chosen values.
Incorporating these new initial values led to decreased run-
times for the Minisat solver [54]. In another study, LSTMs
(i.e., DL) were trained to solve constraint equations [42].
While the LSTMs were not able to beat state-of-the-art con-
straint solvers, they were able to solve constraint equations
from domains they were not trained on, indicating an ability
for ML models to generalize in this space. In general, each of
these studies offers unique ways of solving constraint equa-
tions. While not currently state-of-the-art, they nonetheless
offer a strong starting point for using supervised learning to
decrease the amount of computation time required to solve
constraint equations.
We know of only one research effort using RL for solv-
ing constraint equations. In this study, Mairy et al. used RL
to improve local neighborhood search methods [33]. Local
neighborhood search methods iteratively find solutions to
a constraint equation by finding solutions to various sub-
sets of the constraint equation and combining the subsets to
form the final solution. In order to discover useful subsets,
these local neighborhood search methods must intelligently
explore the space of possible subsets. RL is particularly well
suited for this exploration, since the RL agent can be guided
to choose subsets that are more likely to lead to a valid solu-
tion. This study also indicates that RL may play a useful role
for solving constraint equations in general. The search space
of possible solutions is too large to search naively however,
RL methods offer a way to guide the exploration and thus
reduce the time needed to find a solution.
Several research efforts explored the feasibility of using
GAs to solve constraint equations. GAs were used to find
optimal solutions to constraint problems given a small num-
ber of feasible solutions [10, 52].3 In contrast to this work,
fuzzers prefer solutions that discover new code paths over
optimal solutions for known code paths. However, this work
can benefit fuzzers directly if fitness functions apply heavier
weights to feasible solutions as explored by Venkatraman and
Yen [52]. Finding optimal solutions does benefit fuzzers as
well: optimal solutions reduce input length, thereby reducing
time spent in input generation.
3Finding a small set of feasible solutions is usually straightforward in fuzzing.
The user can provide a small set of paths using his program knowledge, or
a fuzzer run for a small number of iterations can find a small set of feasible
paths.
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One research effort used ML to reduce the size of the
search space rather than to directly solve constraint equa-
tions. Li et al. reformulate the typical collection of path con-
straints as an optimization problem and attempt to reduce
the number of infeasible paths, i.e., paths that can never be
reached due to conflicting constraints [29]. They use the ML
technique RACOS [57], a technique for optimization that
scales well to high dimensional problems, to solve the opti-
mization problems. However, only very small programs of
up to 335 lines were analyzed. In general, fuzzers tend to
generate a large number of infeasible paths, reducing the
efficiency of symbolic execution. Thus, techniques employed
by Li et al. may directly benefit fuzzers by reducing the num-
ber of infeasible paths and allowing more extensive use of
symbolic execution.
Initial explorations in improving symbolic execution by
applying ML show promise. However, the practical utility of
applying ML here remains to be seen. The current research
is typically on small problems and the methods shown in
this section do not beat the state-of-the-art. Thus, improving
both scalability and performance of ML techniques used for
symbolic execution and constraint solving are important
open research challenges.
Post-Fuzzing: Interesting Program States
As mentioned in Section 2, users triage and then analyze in-
teresting program states output by the fuzzer, often manually.
Users triage program states by 1) evaluating for uniqueness
[38], 2) analyzing triaged states to determine reproducibility
and a root cause, and, 3) when fuzzing for vulnerability as-
sessment, determining whether a root cause is exploitable.
ML has primarily been used to categorize crashes (triage) or
to categorize bugs (root cause analysis), although Yan et al.
used Bayesian methods and the !exploitable tool to improve
reliability in determining bug exploitability [55].
Dang et al. triaged crashes by grouping crashes with simi-
lar call stacks using agglomerative hierarchical clustering,
an unsupervised learning technique that clusters data points
with similar features [11]. They introduced their own simi-
larity metric over call stacks, the position-dependent model,
allowing them to use an unlabeled call stack data set for train-
ing. They tested their model over various Microsoft products
and in many cases outperformed previous methods for crash
similarity identification.
Harsh et al. experimented with root cause categorization
using supervised, unsupervised, and semi-supervised tech-
niques [27]; unfortunately, their techniques are limited as
their categories are both extremely broad and system-specific.
Long et al. identified root causes and automatically generated
patches using probabilistic models [32].
Outside of the software domain, supervisedML techniques
have been used to identify root causes more frequently [43].
Specifically, decision trees and support vector machines were
used for root cause analysis on industrial production sys-
tems [12]. Neural networks were used for fault localization
within industrial tank systems [44]. Support vector machines
showed promise in speeding up fault localization on circuit
boards [56]. While none of this research was directly applied
to software, it may be extended to aid root cause analysis in
the software domain.
Challenges. ML is rarely applied to post-fuzzing tasks for
two reasons: 1) ML results and algorithms are often difficult
to interpret, and 2) appropriate training data sets are sparse.
For the first, classification techniques only return a predic-
tion, not an explanation. This makes it particularly difficult
for a user to determine whether a predicted label is correct
and why that label was applied. For example, in root cause
analysis, the user would find it difficult to understand where
the root cause supposedly manifested in the code, either to
validate the label or to correct the root cause [27]. Further,
ML algorithms often build up opaque rules that are difficult
to map into domain knowledge. For the second, we have
very few available labeled data sets, and it is not yet clear
what constitutes a strong, generalizable benchmark data set.
Which of all the possible bugs should be included? Which
programming languages should be represented? How should
we encode a bug and its root cause for an ML algorithm,
especially given that root causes are nuanced, root causes
can vary from system to system, and a bug in one context
may not be a bug in another? Significant research challenges
remain in applying ML to post-fuzzing tasks, specifically im-
proving interpretability of ML models and creating effective
training data sets.
Input and Corpus Minimization
To our knowledge, there has not been any research into input
minimization or corpus minimization using ML. There are
several reasons for this lack of research. First, neither input
minimization nor corpus minimization is a large bottleneck.
The largest bottlenecks exist in the input generation and post-
fuzzing process thus, most research tends to concentrate on
these areas. Second, minimization of input or total corpus
sizes does not naturally lend itself to ML techniques. While
input generation and, to a lesser extent, post-fuzzing are
often able to be formulated as ML problems, minimization is
often achieved successfully using heuristic methods [37].
Seed selection
To our knowledge, there has not been any research in seed se-
lection using ML. However, prior seed selection research does
point to the possibility of future ML research. Seed selection
must balance using current inputs with a known level of per-
formance versus exploring new inputs with an unknown but
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potentially better performance [53]. Reinforcement learning
algorithms are often applied successfully in these types of
scenarios which require a balance of both exploration of new
inputs and utilization of current inputs. Thus, reinforcement
learning algorithms may be well suited for determining an
optimal seed schedule.
4 CONCLUSION
In this survey, we discussed how machine learning (ML) has
been applied to fuzzing. Because fuzzing problems lend them-
selves more naturally to unsupervised and reinforcement
learning techniques, supervised learning is rarely used to sup-
port the fuzzing process. ML is most often used to support the
Generate Inputs stage of the fuzzing process. Unsupervised
methods currently offer the most benefit with tools such as
AFL making unsupervised algorithms part of their workflow.
In contrast, reinforcement learning and deep learning are
being explored for possible improvements but are not yet
part of any standard fuzzing tool. ML has also been applied
to analyze Interesting Program States during post-fuzzing,
helping to triage crashes and support root cause analysis.
However, ML has not been applied to the Select Inputs stage
of the fuzzing process, possibly because this stage is not a
major bottleneck. Additionally ML has not been applied to
evaluating reproducibility of crashes during post-fuzzing.
The lack of ML research in certain portions of the fuzzing
process may be due to ML being less understandable than
other heuristic approaches, or it may be due to a lack of
accessible training data.
While ML has played an important role in the function-
ality of fuzzing systems, there remain many open research
challenges. Recently an influx of researchers have begun
dedicating resources to address some of these challenges.
Fuzzing will continue to play an important role in vulnerabil-
ity assessment in the future. As research in this area grows,
we expect to see the continued application of ML to address
the bottlenecks of the fuzzing process.
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